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Mayday, Mayday!:
How the Current Bankruptcy Code Fails to
Protect the Pensions of Employees
BY AMY LASSITER*
INTRODUCTION
F or years the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"),
the federal insurer of pensions, has been in financial trouble, but
it is rapidly approaching financial catastrophe. In 1990, the director of
the PBGC, James B. Lockhart, spoke prophetically in estimating that the
PBGC's exposure "could be as high as $20 billion to $30 billion in the
event of a major recession that involved a downturn in the steel,
automobile, and airline industries."' The bankruptcies of LTV Steel
Corporation and Bethlehem Steel Corporation turned over $5.4 billion in
unfunded pension obligations,2 and the more recent turnover of US
Airways' pilot pension plan threw another $2.1 billion of unfunded
liabilities into the PBGC's lap.3 The PBGC's deficit now stands at $9.7
billion dollars, but this deficit is likely to double, or even triple, given the
bankruptcy of United Airlines and the potential bankruptcy of Delta
Airlines.4 It is predicted that the airline industry will hand over $80
billion in unfunded pension obligations to the PBGC within the next few
years.5 However, the real concern is that, due to its own structural
*J.D. expected 2006, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank her
father, Mark Lassiter, for his insight and guidance on this piece and throughout her life.
The author would also like to give credit to her mother, Jenna Lassiter, for her love,
patience, and wisdom, without which the author could never have become the writer she
is today.
1 Daniel Keating, Chapter II 's New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and Bankruptcy,
77 MINN. L. REv. 803, 809 n.30 (1993) [hereinafter Keating, Ten-Ton Monster].
2 Editorial, Peanut Futures, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 2004, at B6
[hereinafter Editorial].
3 James R. Asker, Pension Prudence, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Jan.
5, 2004, at 21.
4 Kimberly Blanton, Pensions Grounded?: Airlines Could Be Latest Industry to
Terminate Plans, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2004, at F 1.5ld
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problems, the PBGC will not have the funds to insure even the minimum
6guaranteed portions of these pensions.
Current bankruptcy law allows a company in chapter 11 to reject its
collective bargaining agreement by satisfying a nine-part test.7 The most
disputed element of the test is that the chapter 11 debtor must show that
the proposed modifications are "necessary" to permit reorganization.8
However, bankruptcy courts have recently been favoring a broad inter-
pretation regarding what is "necessary" for reorganization. 9
Once the bankruptcy court has found that termination of the pension
plan meets the "necessity" prong, the PBGC assumes the pension
obligations of the chapter 11 debtor.10 Upon doing this, the PBGC
secures the assets that are currently in the plan and, combining them with
the money it has collected from premiums paid by participating
employers, uses them to pay a statutorily set maximum. 1 This maximum
amount usually pays only a fraction of the promised benefits to each of
the covered participants. 12 With regard to the unfunded portion of its
pension plan, the PBGC then becomes one of the chapter 11 debtor's
unsecured creditors.'
3
The employees of United and US Airways face this situation right
now. They have negotiated with their employers and accepted wage and
benefit reductions, increased hours, and decreased vacation and holiday
leaves in order to prevent the termination of their pension plans. Yet, it
seems they may have made these sacrifices for naught; 14 both airlines are
seeking to terminate all of their defined-benefit plans,' 5 leaving many
workers to collect mere cents on the dollar of what they were promised
as retirement benefits.
16
6 See Keating, Ten-Ton Monster, supra note 1.
7 In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
' 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(1)(A) (1984). For a discussion of the "necessary" element, see
Jay M. Rector, Bankruptcy-How Necessary is 'Necessary' Under Section 1113? Truck
Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, 13 J. CoP. L. 941 (1988).
9 See generally Ellen Schultz, Airlines in Trouble: Industry's Pension Maneuvers
Raise Questions About the Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2004, at A17 (noting that some
high-profile companies have recently convinced bankruptcy courts to accept a broad
interpretation of "necessary").
'
0 See 29 U.S.C § 1341 (1988).
n See Simon Kwan, The Present and Future of Pension Insurance, FRBSF
ECONOMIC LETrER, No. 25, June 13, 2003, at 1.
12 see id
"3 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b).
14 See Susan Carey, Airlines Keep Fighting for Viability, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004,
at A5 [hereinafter Fighting for Viability].
16 See Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy, and Moral Hazard, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 65, 66 (1991) [hereinafter Keating, Pension Insurance].
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This note contends that the current Bankruptcy Code fails to provide
an adequate remedy to the PBGC and to the employees of a chapter 11
debtor when a pension plan is terminated. Part I explores the develop-
ment of the PBGC and assesses -its effectiveness in light of its legislative
purpose. 17 In addition, Part I examines the Bankruptcy Code, focusing on
its impact upon an employee's ability to receive the maximum pension
amount after a distress termination.18 Part II discusses the current
predicament of the airline industry as related to the PBGC and
Bankruptcy Code.19 Part III analyzes proposed solutions to the PBGC's
financial issues.20 The note concludes that, without a significant alter-
ation in the priority status given to employees and/or to the PBGC under
the Bankruptcy Code, employees will be left out in the cold.
I. BACKGROUND LEGAL CONCEPTS
A. The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC)
There are two general types of employee benefit plans: 1) defined-
benefit and 2) defined-contribution. In 1985, there were 114,000
defined-benefit plans; today, there are only 31,00021 because new
businesses have decided it is much easier financially to commit to a
defined-contribution plan rather than to a defined-benefit plan.22 In a
defined-contribution plan, the company promises to contribute a per-
centage of an employee's income to an account plan,23 making no
promises regarding the benefits the employee will receive upon
retirement.24
On the other hand, a defined-benefit plan places an obligation on the
company to contribute the promised benefit. 5 Contributions are invested
and any gain or loss affects the employer's obligation.26 In the end, the
17 See infra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 69-101 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 102-132 and accompanying text.
21 Peter Krouse, A Storm Is Brewing for U.S. Pension Agency; Terminated Plans,
Old Rules Blamed, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 15, 2004, at CI.
22 See generally id. (noting that defined-benefit plans are rapidly being replaced by
defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k)s); see also Nanette Byrnes & Davis Welch,
The Benefits Trap: Old-line Companies Have Pledged a Trillion Dollars to Retirees.
Now They're Struggling to Compete With New Rivals, and Many Can't Pay the Bill,
BusINESS WEEK, July 19, 2004, at 64 (discussing the reasons for a shift from defined-
benefit to defined-contribution plans).
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988).
24 See Keating, Ten-Ton Monster, supra note 1, at 806.
25 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35).
26 See generally Keating, Ten-Ton Monster, supra note 1.
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only thing that matters in a defined-benefit plan is that the employee
receives the benefit promised, regardless of the amount the employer had
to contribute to meet that promise.27
In 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")
Title IV established the PBGC to prevent workers from being deprived
of retirement benefits due to underfunded defined-benefit plans.28 Under
ERISA, a pension plan is underfunded if the market value of a plan's
assets is less than 90% of the plan's current liabilities. 29 When a defined-
benefit plan terminates while underfunded, the pension obligations are
given to the PBGC.
30
When the plan is handed over to the PBGC, it ensures that each
employee receives benefits up to the statutorily set limit.3 Currently, the
maximum payout the PBGC will allocate annually is $44,386 for a sixty-
five-year old;32 this amount is decreased if an employee has not yet
reached age sixty-five. Additionally, the cap is set at the year the plan is
terminated.3 In fact, employees usually receive less than the maximum
payout and also take a significant cut in pension benefits when a
company hands its plans over to the PBGC.34
The PBGC's problems merely begin with the maximum payout. The
corporation has only four financial resources: 1) insurance premiums
paid to the corporation by defined-benefit pension sponsors; 2) assets of
terminated pension plans; 3) recoveries in bankruptcy from former plan
sponsors; and 4) earnings on invested assets. 35 Since the assets recovered
from terminated plans are always insufficient to pay out the benefits, the
PBGC must act as an insurer, making up the difference between the
assets and the insured amount. Several problems arise at this stage.
First, the premiums are not risk-based like most insurance
companies' premiums. Instead, PBGC premiums are variable based on
underfunding rather than on the likelihood of termination.36 In addition,
with the trend away from defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution
plans, in the past decade the PBGC has seen its premium income fall
27 1d
"
28 Kwan, supra note 11. ERISA does not cover defined-contribution plans. See
Keating, supra note 16, at 69.
29 Nest Eggs Without the Yolk-Corporate Pensions, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2003, at
59.
30 See 29 U.S.C § 1341 (1988).
31 See id.
32 See Blanton, supra note 4.
33 Id.
34 Albert B. Crenshaw, United Plan for Pensions Not Legal, Agency Says, WASH.
POST, Aug. 14, 2004, at EOI.
35 See Kwan, supra note 11.
36 Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 9331(a), (b), 101 Stat. 1330, 367-
68 (1987).
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substantially while its payout of benefits has more than tripled.37 In 2003,
for example, the PBGC paid out $2.5 billion in benefits but only took in
$1 billion in premium income.38 As of September 2003, the PBGC had a
deficit almost three times what it was one year earlier.39 Considering
there is another $85 billion in unfunded pension liabilities from
companies with junk bond ratings, the PBGC is in serious trouble.40
This unhealthy financial climate has created a situation where the
PBGC may not be able to pay out the meager amount it insures for
pension participants. The PBGC was created to prevent unfunded
pension plans from leaving lifelong employees of companies without
their promised retirement income.4 ' Thus, the question presents itself:
what must be done to achieve ERISA's original objective in creating the
PBGC?
B. The Relationship between the PBGC and Bankruptcy Law
Beyond the PBGC's structural problems, the insurer faces additional
problems regarding its claims in bankruptcy court. When ERISA was
established in 1974, Congress failed to see the big picture. ERISA is a
complex maze of legislation that becomes even more convoluted in light
of the Bankruptcy Code.
Defined-benefit pension plans are nothing more than collective
bargaining agreements. Over the years, employees have sacrificed wage
increases in exchange for promises of retirement benefits.4  However,
these promises are repeatedly turning up empty. Old-line companies
with defined-benefit plans are becoming unable to compete with the new
companies in their industries that do not have the same pension
37 U.S. Representative Peter G. Fitzgerald (R-IL) Holds Hearing On Benefit
Pension Plans, FDCH POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 15, 2003 [hereinafter FDCH
POLITICAL TRANSCRiPTS]. Junk bonds pay high yields to bondholders because the
borrower has no other option. Their credit ratings are low and there is a greater risk of the
company defaulting. The significance of the PBGC's $85 million in unfunded pension
liabilities from companies with junk bond ratings is that these companies are more likely
to enter bankruptcy and hand their pensions off to the PBGC.
39Id
39 See Bymes & Welch, supra note 22, at 68.
40 Paul Kangas & Susie Gharib, Nightly Business Report, CEOWIPE, Jan. 15, 2004,
available at http://www.nightlybusiness.org/transcript/2004/transcript011504.html (last
visited Mar. 23, 2005).
41 Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy Code § 1114: Congress' Empty Response to the
Retiree Plight, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 17 n.22 (1993), citing Rettig v. PBGC, 744 F.2d 133,
137 (D.C. Cir.1984) (noting that the incidence of such tragic cases of employees being
left without pensions helped to spur the passage of ERISA) [hereinafter Keating,
Congress'Empty Response].
42 See generally Carey, Fighting for Viability, supra note 14.
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obligations.43 In order to be more competitive, these companies are
seeking to do away with their pension promises and bankruptcy law is
allowing them to do it.44
The Bankruptcy Code permits a company to terminate a collective
bargaining agreement by satisfying a nine-part test.45 If terminated,
defined-benefit plans are handed over to the PBGC. The test requires
that: 1) the debtor in possession make a proposal to the Union to modify
the collective bargaining agreement; 2) the proposal be based on the
most complete and reliable information available at the time of the
proposal; 3) the proposed modifications be necessary to permit the reor-
ganization of the debtor; 4) the proposed modifications assure that all
creditors, the debtor, and all affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably; 5) the debtor provide the Union with any information nec-
essary to evaluate the proposal; 6) between the time the proposal is made
and the time of the hearing on approval of the rejection of the existing
collective bargaining agreement, the debtor meet at reasonable times
with the Union; 7) at the meetings the debtor confer in good faith in
attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective
bargaining agreement; 8) the Union refused to accept the proposal
without good cause; and 9) the balance of the equities must clearly favor
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.46
Under this test, a company can present to a representative of its
employees a proposal to modify or to terminate a defined-benefit plan.47
That representative has the right to reject the modification or termination
for good cause. However, if the representative chooses to reject the new
plan, the company may go to a bankruptcy court to request an order
terminating the plan. If the bankruptcy judge finds that the representative
rejected the new plan without good cause and that the balance of equities
clearly favors termination, the company will be allowed to terminate
despite the representative's refusal.48 A refusal to accept a modification
that reduces employee benefits under a pension plan may lead to an even
more inequitable plan under which employees may receive only a
fraction of the benefits promised if handed over to the PBGC. As a
43 See generally Jerry Flint, Solve the Pension Mess, FORBES, Sept. 29, 2003, at 74.
44 See supra notes 7 and 38 and accompanying text.
41 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1984); see also In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (establishing the nine-part test).
46 See In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see generally Jeffrey Berman,
Nobody Likes Rejection Unless You're a Debtor in Chapter 11: Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements Under 11 US.C. 1113, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 169, 173 (1989)
(noting that courts have uniformly followed this nine-part test).
11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (1984).
48 § 1113(c).
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result, this system places an undue burden on the employees' repre-
sentative to make sacrifices on behalf of the employees.49
Once the bankruptcy court has found that the chapter Il debtor
satisfies the relevant nine-part test, the PBGC takes over the debt and
acquires an unsecured creditor's claim against the company for the
unfunded pension obligations. 50 Section 507(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy
Code creates an unsecured priority for "wages, salaries, or commissions,
including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay. 51 However, that
priority only applies to wages earned within ninety days of either the
employer's bankruptcy filing or the employer's cessation of business.52
Furthermore, the priority attaches only to $2000 for each worker,53 and
§ 507(a)(4) gives the PBGC a claim for unpaid minimum funding
contributions.54 Furthermore, this priority is also limited to contributions
arising from services rendered within 180 days before the employer's
bankruptcy filing or the employer's cessation of business, and it cannot
exceed $2000 per employee. 5
The priorities granted to the PBGC by the Bankruptcy Code are
severely limited, but more importantly they fail to deal with claims
arising under § 1113.56 Thus, when a plan is terminated both employees
and the PBGC are left without any heightened unsecured priority for the
unfunded obligations.57 In this situation, it is unlikely that the PBGC will
see more than eight cents on the dollar on its unsecured claim.58
In sum, the PBGC fails to achieve the objectives for which it was
created under ERISA. The mechanisms intended to safeguard employee
interests are inadequate. Employee representatives are forced to accept
disadvantageous pension plan modifications to avoid a more disad-
vantageous result-seeing the plans handed over to the PBGC. The
Bankruptcy Code's priority for employee wages is too limited in time
and dollar amount to offer protection, and as a result neither an employee
nor the PBGC may adequately challenge the discharge of pension
obligations sought by a business debtor. The following section discusses
these problems in the specific context of the airline industry.
49 See Carey, Fighting for Viability, supra note 14.
5o 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1988).
51 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1988).
52 Id.
53 id.
14 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4).
55 Id.
56 Daniel Keating, The Continuing Puzzle of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Bankruptcy, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 503, 539 (1994) (explaining that the only claims
enjoyed by workers are found in § 507) [hereinafter Keating, Continuing Puzzle].
57 Id.
53 Keating, Pension Insurance, supra note 16, at 66.
2004-20051
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II. THE AIRLINES
A. Introduction
The airline, industry has a $31 billion shortfall in its defined-benefit
plans.5 9 Predictably, the industry's crisis worsened after the September
1 1th terrorist attacks.6 ° Increased security taxes placed a heavy burden on
the airlines and the heightened fear among passengers led to decreased
sales and other serious financial problems.6' This year's drastic rise in oil
prices has undoubtedly sealed the fates of several major carriers.62
In order to stay competitive with the cheaper airlines like AirTran
and JetBlue, the old-line airlines are trying to either modify or terminate
their pension obligations to pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, and
63management. To acquire the loans needed to stay afloat, or simply to
pay off existing debts, the airlines claim they must shed "the financial
albatross" of pension liabilities.64
In August 2004, United Airlines followed in US Airways' footsteps,
becoming the second old-line airline to seek bankruptcy protection.65
Both companies seek to eradicate their pension obligations to pilots and
all other employees.66 In addition, Delta Air Lines and ATA Airlines
have threatened to file for bankruptcy. 67 Given the recent trend, they will
likely seek termination of their pensions as well.
B. US Airways
In March 2003, US Airways filed a motion seeking to terminate its
airline pilot pension plans in order to successfully emerge from
bankruptcy. 68 Applying the relevant nine-part test, the court approved
the termination, finding it "necessary" for the airline to successfully
reorganize. 69 The airline returned to the bankruptcy court, seeking court
59 Blanton, supra note 4.
60 id.
61 See Amy Schatz & Susan Carey, Airlines Take Their Problems to Congress,
WALL Si. J., June 3, 2004, at B2.
62 id.
63 id.
64 d.
65 Schultz, supra note 9.
66 See Carey, Fighting for Viability, supra note 14.
67 Schultz, supra note 9.
6 8 In re US Airways Group, 296 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).
69 Id. at 748 (holding that the financial requirements for a distress termination had
been met).
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ordered employee wage cuts and threatening termination of all its
remaining pension plans.70
US Airways' $2.1 billion in unfunded pilot pension obligations were
given to the PBGC after the plans' termination in 2003.71 The
termination came after the pilots agreed to $565 million in annual
concessions in order to aid the company in its chapter 11 reorganization
and to prevent pension termination." The termination left many pilots
with a mere fraction of what they were promised in their original
agreements. Business Week ran a story involving a nineteen-year veteran
of US Airways, Captain Tim Baker.73 Although Captain Baker was to
receive a six-figure annual pension, when he retires he will get only
$28,585 a year from the PBGC as a result of the pension termination. 74
Magnifying this injustice, US Airways honored employment contracts
with its top three executives by paying them $35 million in lump-sum
retirement benefits while it sought to terminate the pilots' pension
plans.75
Now other US Airways employees find their employment contracts
in jeopardy. The court approved US Airways' motion for temporary
court-ordered wage cuts, pension decreases, increased hours, and
decreased number of planes in the fleet.7 6 This decision affects the
collective bargaining agreements between the airline and the unions of its
pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, fleet service, ramp workers, cus-
tomer-service agents, reservation agents, and maintenance training
specialists.77 However, much like the $565 million per year concession
the pilots made to US Airways, these cuts threaten to be a mere stepping
stone toward complete plan termination.
Just one month after the bankruptcy court approved the requested
cuts, US Airways confirmed that it would seek termination of its three
70 See In re US Airways, Inc., No. 04-13819, 2004 WL 2578966 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
Oct. 15, 2004).
71 See Asker, supra note 3, at 21.
72 See Frank Reeves, Airlines Pension Payouts Revealed; US Airways Paid $35
Million to Top 3 Former Execs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 26, 2003, at A-1.
73 Bymes & Welch, supra note 22. Baker was voted out of his position as Union
representative for his role in the agreement reached between the pilots' union and US
Airways to "dump" their pension plan on the PBGC. Id.74See Keating, Ten-Ton Monster, supra note 1, at 807. "[T]he insurance will not
cover benefit increases that resulted from plan amendments adopted within the five years
prior to termination, and employees do not continue to accrue benefits after plan
termination." Id. Therefore, Captain Baker can only get what he was entitled to the year
the plan was terminated, minus any increases in the last five years.
75 Reeves, supra note 72.
76 In re US Airways, Inc., No. 04-13819, 2004 WL 2578966 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct.
15, 2004).
77 Id.
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defined-benefit plans in January 2005.78 These plans cover 53,000 active
and retired workers and would bring $2.1 billion in unfunded pension
obligations to the PBGC. 79 Once the plans are handed over to the PBGC,
the other airline employees will find themselves in the same position as
Captain Baker, collecting a mere fraction of what they were originally
promised.
C. United Airlines
United Airlines has been under bankruptcy court protection for the
last two years.80 Already, United's employees have voluntarily agreed to
cuts totaling $2.5 billion per year. But the airline claims that these cuts
are insufficient, so it is asking a Chicago bankruptcy court to abrogate its
labor contracts if an agreement cannot be reached with its workers.81
After receiving massive concessions from its employees, United now
seeks labor savings, including $191 million from pilots, $180 million
from machinists, $138 million from flight attendants, and $101 million
from mechanics. 82 Moreover, even while seeking these concessions,
United has confirmed that it intends to terminate four underfunded
pension plans.83
United's four pension plans cover 123,000 active and retired
employees.8 4 If United is allowed to transfer its pensions to the PBGC,
an estimated $8.3 billion in unfunded obligations will be loaded on the
PBGC.8" Much like the employees at US Airways, United's employees
will likely collect, in some cases, less than fifty cents on the dollar of
what they were promised.
8 6
Since United confirmed it would seek termination of its pension
plans, the PBGC has said it will ask a court to allow it to assume the pilot
pension plan immediately in order to prevent further accumulation of
78 Susan Carey, US Airways Moves to Force Cost Cuts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2004,
at A3 [hereinafter US Airways]; see generally Susan Carey, By Assuming Plan for Pilots
At United, Federal Insurer Hopes to Limit Liabilities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2004, at A2.
"The move (to terminate plans) comes amid labor tension at many carriers, including
employee absences at US Airways Group Inc. last weekend that led to hundreds of
canceled flights." Id.
79 Id.
80 See Susan Carey, UAL Asks Bankruptcy Judge To Let It Void Labor Contracts,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2004, at A6.
81 Id.
82 Id. The Association of Flight Attendants is threatening to strike if its contract is
voided. Id.
83 Carey, Fighting for Viability, supra note 14.
84 Carey, USAirways, supra note 78.
8' Krouse, supra note 21.
86 Byrnes & Welch, supra note 22.
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unfunded obligations.87 This plan currently has $2.8 billion in assets to
cover $5.7 billion in liabilities.88 The agency claims that assumption of
the plan immediately will avoid an additional $140 million in liabilities,
and United could thereby maintain three of its pension plans. 89 However,
despite the actions of the PBGC the airline asserts that it will still seek
termination of all four of its plans. 90
D. Delta Airlines
Delta Airlines is now struggling to stay out of bankruptcy court. The
airline has recently finished negotiations with its pilot union, and the
pilots are currently voting on whether to take a 32.5% cut in pay.9'
However, even if the pay cut is approved, Delta plans on eliminating
7000 jobs to avoid bankruptcy. 92 This is a familiar pattern. In light of US
Airways and United, it is highly unlikely that this will be the last
concession Delta employees are expected to make. Instead, it seems
these concessions are just the beginning. Delta has already threatened to
file for bankruptcy, which could signal the potential termination of
pension plans.93
As airlines continue to hand over their pension obligations to the
PBGC, more airlines will attempt the same in order to remain competi-
tive. Eleven airlines have $31 billion in pension plan underfunding94 and
it is estimated the "Big Six" airlines will not post a profit until 2005.9'
Even some discount carriers are seeking bankruptcy protection. In
October 2004, for example, ATA Airlines filed for bankruptcy. 96 The
airline industry appears bound to the same fate as the steel industry,
which has handed over $5.4 billion in unfunded pension obligations to
the PBGC.97
87 Carey, US Airways, supra note 78.
88 Id.
89 id.
90 Id.
91 Evan Perez, Airline Averts Chapter 11 As Labor Agreement Cuts $1 Billion in
Pay, Benefits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2004, at A3.
92 Carey, Fighting for Viability, supra note 14.
93 id.
94 See Caroline Daniel, Airline Funds Plunge to Record $31 Billion Shortfall, FIN.
TIMES, Jun. 18, 2004, at 30.
95 Major Carriers May Not Survive Growing Pension Debt, AIRLINE FINANCIAL
NEWS, Dec. 15, 2003, vol. 21, no. 47. The Big Six airlines are American, Continental,
Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways. Id.
96 Perez, supra note 91.
97 See Editorial, supra note 2.
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E. Other Industries
Concern over the plight of those employees whose plans are
transferred to the PBGC is not restricted to the airline industry; this trend
is an epidemic.98 The automotive industry will be the next to suffer the
fates of the airline and steel industries. With the growth of young
automobile manufacturers like Toyota, U.S. competitors find themselves
making significantly less per vehicle, partially due to the cost of their
defined-benefit pension obligations.99 For example, General Motors'
pension obligations in 2003 totaled $1784 per vehicle, according to
Morgan Stanley, whereas Toyota's were less than $200 per vehicle. 0
IBM and Verizon Communications are among others that must contend
with new competitors that have chosen cheaper pension plans and can
therefore provide cheaper products or services.' 0' Unfortunately, it is too
late for the employees of United and US Airways. Nonetheless, given the
obvious trend, -something can and should be done to protect the
remaining 44 million Americans still covered by defined-benefit plans
from facing undeservedly meager payouts from the PBGC. The
following section presents potential solutions to this serious problem.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Deferred Payments
Congress recently amended ERISA and the IRS Code to provide
"relief' to the airlines and other companies that are "overburdened" with
their pension obligations by allowing minimum payments to be deferred
for two years.102 This solution is as ineffective as putting a band-aid on a
gunshot wound.
The problem with this amendment is that the pensions are already
underfunded. There is tremendous risk that the plans may become even
more underfunded as time passes, then when payment comes due the
plan would have to terminate. 10 3 The PBGC would be saddled with even
98 Byrnes & Welch, supra note 22. "The escalating cost of retirement plans is a
critical issue at a range of long-established companies from Boeing to Ford Motor to
IBM, many of which compete against younger companies with little or nothing in retiree
costs." Id.
99 Id.
1oo Id.
101 Id.
102 See generally Pension Funding Equity Act, PL 108-218, 118 Stat 596 (2004).
103 See generally FDCH POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 37 (analyzing the
potential outcome of offering a moratorium to United Airlines on their required
contributions).
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greater liability than they would without the deferment. Given the current
deficit of the PBGC and the likelihood of several more large-plan
terminations, the risk is too great that the insurer would be unable to
make payouts to the 44 million people affected.
B. Risk-based Premiums
Many have suggested that the solution to the PBGC's problems lies
in switching to risk-based premiums.' °4 Currently, ERISA does not
allow for risk-based premiums, instead making premiums variable solely
on the state of underfunding. 1°5 The premiums carry a flat rate of $19 per
plan participant and a variable rate of $9 per $1000 of unfunded vested
benefits. 0 6 Every other insurance company bases its premiums on risk.1
0 7
Under a risk-based premium scheme, the PBGC would charge "varying
premiums based on risks plan sponsors present to the agency, measured
by the companies' credit ratings, asset allocation of the pension plans,
exposure to interest rate changes and structural risk in a particular
industry sector."' 0 8 Theoretically, if the PBGC based its premiums on
risk, its deficit would be much lower. As described previously, its current
payouts are significantly higher than the premiums it receives from plan
sponsors.109 For example, United, if it terminates its plans, will have paid
$50 million in premiums since 1974 in order to shed its $6.4 billion in
obligations." 0
Although this may seem like the best solution, there are several
reasons why it will only worsen the position of the employees once a
plan is handed over to the PBGC. First, risk-based premiums will
increase the premiums of all the sponsoring employers of the PBGC,
even those who are fully funding their plans. Those who are solvent and
still supporting their defined-benefit plans will more than likely
terminate sponsoring any future defined-benefit plans, thereby further
104 Vineeta Anand, Ready to Work: New PBGC headset tofLx system; Belt wants to
end contradictions in pension regulations, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, May 17, 2004, at
2. The new executive director of the PBGC wants to be able to "charge varying premiums
depending on the risks plan sponsors present to the agency, measured by the companies'
credit ratings, asset allocation of the pension plans, exposure to interest rate changes and
structural risk in a particular industry sector." Id.
105 See 29 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
106 Kwan, supra note 11.
107 See FDCH POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 37.
108 See Anand, supra note 104.
i09 Byrnes & Welch, supra note 22.
110 Douglas McLeod, Pension System in Need of Saving, BUSINESS INSURANCE, Sept.
27, 2004, at 28.
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decreasing the future premium income of the PBGC."' In addition,
increased premiums will more than likely deter any companies
considering establishing a defined-benefit plan from establishing one,
thus preventing any increase in premium income.'12 As discussed
previously, the PBGC's ability to pay out the insured amounts to
participants depends on the amount of premiums taken in and the return
the insurer gets on both the investment of those premiums and the
investment of assets collected from underfunded pensions.' 3 With plans
being so underfunded, the insurer relies more and more heavily upon
returns from the investment of premiums. Thus, if premiums dip even
lower the PBGC will be even less able to pay out the insured amount to
participants.
The government has been deterred from this option for a similar
reason: it wants to encourage and preserve defined-benefit plans at what
seems to be any cost." 4 The government's reasoning, though
paternalistic, is that people do not plan effectively for their retirement
under a defined-contribution plan, so companies should be responsible
for insuring sufficient retirement incomes for employees.1 5 Under a
defined-contribution plan, the employee is guaranteed a specified
contribution into the plan account;' 6 beyond this, the employee must
monitor whether his retirement benefits are going to be adequate in light
of the contribution and how that contribution has fared as an investment
in the plan. Many employees simply fail to monitor their plans
effectively. Although the government would like to see defined-benefit
plans continue for the good of the public, the reality is that, due to the
enormous economic advantage of defined-contribution plans over
defined-benefit plans, defined-benefit plans are becoming extinct."'
Still, the government would like to see the defined-benefit plans in
existence continue even though an increase in the premium price will
cause healthy sponsors to stop establishing defined-benefit plans, thus
preventing other companies from looking to defined-benefit plans as an
option.' 
8
111 Byrnes & Welch, supra note 22 ("Faced with higher insurance costs, they could
opt out, rapidly accelerating the system's decline as the remaining health participants
become overwhelmed by the needy.").
112 id.
113 Kwan, supra note 11.
"4 See generally FDCH POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 37 (discussing the
importance of maintaining defined-benefit plans for the welfare of the people).
"s Id
16 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988).
117 See generally Krouse, supra note 2 1.
18 Byrnes & Welch, supra note 22.
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A second, even larger problem with this solution is that companies
that are already having difficulty contributing to their pension plans will
have even greater difficulty if their premiums increase. Essentially, the
companies attempting to salvage their underfunded pension plans are at a
higher risk of terminating their plans due to underfunding, and under this
proposal their premiums will increase the most. Given their already
precarious position, these sponsors will likely be pushed over the edge by
the cost of their pensions and will be forced to seek termination of their
plans through bankruptcy. Since the PBGC is already overextended, if
this took place it would likely be unable to pay out even the meager
insured portion of the participants' pensions. Clearly, this is an
inadequate result and an inadequate solution.
C. PBGC and Employee Superpriority
Another possible solution is to change the priority status of
aggrieved employees and the PBGC through amendment of the
Bankruptcy Code. Under current law, the PBGC and employees of the
terminating company have unsecured creditors' claims against plan
sponsors that terminate their plans, meaning they receive mere cents on
the dollar value of their claim." 19 This could be changed; the Bankruptcy
Code could be amended to provide the PBGC and employees with a
superpriority unsecured claim. This possibility is explored in more detail
in the following sections.
1. PBGC Superpriority
First, it is vital that the superpriority claim be subordinate to the
claims of secured creditors. Otherwise, the benefits of seeking a secured
loan would be eliminated. It would be as much an injustice to deprive a
secured creditor of its secured status, the result of a bargained-for
agreement, as it is to allow companies to deprive employees of their
pension benefits through the bankruptcy process.
The superpriority unsecured claim would function similarly to the
§ 507 priorities now acquired by some unsecured creditors. 20 The
problem with the claim currently offered to the PBGC under § 507(a)(4)
is that it is limited to only $2000 per participant and must be made within
180 days of the plan's termination or cessation of business.12' This leaves
119 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b).
120 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
121 § 507(a)(4).
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the PBGC collecting less than eight cents on the dollar on its unsecured
claim.122
Giving the PBGC a superpriority unsecured creditor's claim would
help it regain solvency because the amount the PBGC would receive on
the dollar value 'of its bankruptcy claims would increase dramatically.
More importantly, it should allow them to pay out the full insured
pension amount owed to plan participants of terminated plans.
The potential problem with this plan is the effect it will have on other
unsecured creditors. However, the only standard by which chapter 11
reorganization is to be measured is whether the unsecured creditors are
as well off as they would have been in a chapter 7 liquidation.
1 23
Therefore, so long as the unsecured creditors receive as much as they
would have through liquidation, there is no legal impediment.
2. Employee Superpriority
The Bankruptcy Code fails to state whether the employees covered
under a terminated plan have a right to damages for this termination.'
4
The wage priority in § 507(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code and the sanctity
of employees' rights in non-bankruptcy law together support the
principle that employees are uniquely vulnerable in the marketplace and
thus a high premium should be placed on ensuring that they receive at
least a minimum of the wages and benefits on which they rely. It would
accord with this principle to elevate employees' claims in bankruptcy to
superpriority unsecured claims for the difference between the amount
promised in collective bargaining agreements and the amount received
from the PBGC insurance program.
Outside of bankruptcy, if a company backs out of a collective
bargaining agreement, the employees have a contractual right to sue for
damages. 125 However, this right is removed under the current Bankruptcy
Code.126 Granting employees superiority unsecured claims in bankruptcy
would return to employees the right to receive damages for this breach of
contract.
There are several reasons for granting employees favored status
against their employer in bankruptcy. First, as compared with most
investors, employees ' are less able to diversify their credit portfolio in
122 Keating, Pension Insurance, supra note 16, at 66.
123 See id. at 184.
124 Keating, Continuing Puzzle, supra note 56, at 534.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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order to minimize the impact of their employer filing bankruptcy. 127 In
addition, employees are not investing disposable income as most
investors do. If an employer goes bankrupt and terminates its pension
plan, its employees lose an amount much greater than they would have
been willing to risk in traditional investments. On the other hand, a
general creditor usually has weighed the risks against the potential
benefits of an investment and is prepared for a potential loss. Employees
lose the majority of their retirement, an amount they had been promised
and upon which they have relied throughout their careers..
Another reason employees should be given a superpriority unsecured
claim is that when an employer is seeking to reorganize, the employees
are a crucial element to its success and should be valued as such. 28
Under the current regime, an employee's wages and pension are used as
a bartering tool in negotiations with a company's creditors to achieve
reorganization.1
29
By allowing employees a superpriority unsecured claim against their
employers for lost pensions, the Code would prevent millions of workers
from retiring on only a fraction of what they had been promised. In
addition, so long as the other unsecured creditors remain as well off as
they would have been in a chapter 7 liquidation, there is no legal problem
with this proposal.
Instead of burdening employees as the current system does, this
proposal would force creditors to monitor the companies with which they
do business, to make sure they lend to companies that sufficiently fund
their pension plans.' 30 It would be beneficial not only to the PBGC in
collecting on the unfunded portion of pension plans but also to the
overall funding of defined-benefit plans. It would provide an additional
incentive for companies to maintain well-funded plans instead of taking
large risks with the money that should have been contributed to the
plan. 131
It is possible that creditors simply will not take the time to
effectively monitor how adequately their debtor companies fund pension
plans. However, in a market economy, this possibility is not a sufficient
reason to discount this option. Incentives in a free-market economy
would simply reward the creditor for being informed about the loan it is
making. If creditors choose to ignore this responsibility, the loss falls on
them.
127 Daniel Keating, The Fruits of Labor: Worker Priorities in Bankruptcy, 35 ARIZ.
L. REV. 905, 906 (1993).1281Id.
129 See supra notes 14 and 90.
130 Keating, Ten-Ton Monster, supra note 16, at 101.
131 id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The PBGC was created to provide greater protection to employees
with defined-benefit plans. As the enactment of ERISA suggests,
Congress did not want employees working their entire lives only to see
what they had been working for disappear. However, the current system
fails to achieve this goal. Instead, workers are finding themselves
collecting only a fraction of what they were promised in collective
bargaining agreements. It is even more disconcerting that many workers
may not receive any of their pensions if something is not done to change
the rights they are given after a company has terminated its plans.
Congress has recently proposed a lot of "quick fixes" regarding the
current pension underfunding crisis. However, the proposed solutions do
nothing more than delay the inevitable. Instead, Congress must look for a
permanent solution to the plight of defined-benefit plans. They need to
recognize that the weight of pension liabilities is heavy and that the
PBGC can only withstand so much before it is too great for the insurer to
handle because, at that point, the only remaining options will be either
leaving millions of retirees without pensions or resorting to a government
bail-out.'
PBGC and employee unsecured superpriority claims are the best
solutions to avoid the bleak financial future currently facing defined-
benefit pension plan participants. By giving the PBGC and employees a
superpriority unsecured claim, the Congress could fulfill the original
purpose of the PBGC-protecting the pensions of employees.
132 Rector, supra note 8, at 951.
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